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Case No. 920379-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992 Repl. Vol.) 
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
conducting an inadequate voir dire, and denying the motion for a 
mistrial stemming from a juror's concealment of material information 
during voir dire? 
2. Did the trial court misconstrue the firearm enhancement 
statute in sentencing Mr. Ewell? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In assessing the trial court's voir dire of the prospective 
jurors, this Court will review with some deference the totality of 
the questioning to determine if the trial court provided Mr. Ewell 
with sufficient information to evaluate the jurors, or whether the 
trial court abused his discretion. State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988). The remaining questions involve questions of law, 
which this Court addresses under the non-deferential correction of 
error standard of review. E.g. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the 
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-8-1001 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 46 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Ewell was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, 
one count of theft, and one count of theft by deception in case no. 
911901243, and with a count of aggravated robbery in case no. 
911901244. The magistrate found probable cause in both cases, and 
bound the cases over to district court. In case no. 911901243, Mr. 
Ewell pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and the theft 
and theft by deception charges were dismissed. In case no. 
911901244, Judge Sawaya presided over a jury trial on December 12 
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and 13 of 1991. The jury convicted Mr. Ewell as he was charged, and 
Judge Sawaya sentenced Mr. Ewell to serve a term of five years to 
life with a one year firearm enhancement for the conviction charged 
in case no. 911901243, to a consecutive term of five years to life 
with a firearm enhancement for the conviction charged in 911901244, 
and to an additional five years, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 
76-3-203(4). 
Mr. Ewell appealed in both cases, and on Mr. Ewell's 
motion, this Court consolidated the appeals. 
On October 15, 1992, counsel for Mr. Ewell moved this Court 
to take judicial notice of and/or supplement the record with a 
transcript of a voir dire from a criminal case before Judge Rokich, 
because the foreman of Mr. Ewell's jury admitted to a bias against 
non-testifying criminal defendants in the Rokich voir dire, but did 
not disclose this during the Ewell voir dire, which occurred two 
days after the Rokich voir dire. The State opposed the motion, 
arguing that this Court should wait to address the judicial review 
issue until briefing is complete, that supplementation of the record 
was not appropriate, and that the briefing schedule should be 
reset. This Court denied the motion, but did not indicate whether 
the denial was with prejudice, or reflected the State's position 
that the motion was premature. Mr. Ewell hereby renews the motion. 
A copy of the motion, the State's response, and this Court's order 
are in Appendix 2 to this brief. A copy of the Rokich transcript 
was filed with this Court and with the Attorney General's Office 
when the motion was originally filed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Donald Runyon robbed Christopher Ward Hase at the point of 
a shotgun, as Mr. Hase was walking out of the Midvale Mining Company 
Restaurant with two cash bags on May 28, 1991 at about 9:15 to 9:30 
a.m. (T. 44-54). The restaurant is located at 390 West 7200 South 
(T. 44). Mr. Hase gave Mr. Runyon one of the cash bags, and later 
threw the other bag under a car (T. 53-54). Mr. Hase resisted Mr. 
Runyon's demand to relinquish all of the money, and a struggle 
ensued, in which Mr. Hase knocked the shotgun and cash bag on the 
ground and pinned Mr. Runyon to the ground (T. 54-56, 70). Mr. Hase 
felt someone hitting him on the head and trying to pull him off of 
Mr. Runyon from behind, and his employees then came to his rescue 
and helped him restrain Mr. Runyon (T. 57). Mr. Hase was apparently 
hit with what could have been the shotgun, and required 
approximately twenty seven stitches (T. 57, 72). 
The person who hit Mr. Hase from behind did not take either 
cash bag — one bag was still under the car, where Mr. Hase had 
thrown it, and one was still on the ground (T. 57, 70). 
Mr. Hase remembered a blue and white van with Larry H. 
Miller plates, and remembered seeing a person with a nylon-masked 
face get in the van and drive away (T. 58-59). He described the 
person as being "shorter," "five sevenish," male, Caucasian, with 
blonde hair that Mr. Hase could see from under the nylon (T. 59). 
The person in the van drove the van "in and out" (apparently of the 
restaurant parking lot) a couple of times, and then drove off on 
Fourth West (T. 59). 
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Mr. Hase recognized Mr. Ewell in court because Mr. Ewell 
used to work as a dishwasher and his mother was a night waitress and 
his step-father was a dishwasher at the restaurant (T. 47-48, 73). 
Mr. Hase had not seen Mr. Ewell's mother for five or six months 
prior to the robbery, had not seen Mr. Ewell's step-father for a 
couple of months prior to the robbery, and could not recall when he 
had last seen Mr. Ewell prior to the robbery (T. 75). 
Mr. Hase testified that he had described the van to the 
police, but had not described the driver or accused Jason Ewell as 
being involved in the robbery (T. 76). 
Mr. Hase indicated that he and Mr. Ewell had had a "run-in" 
over a check (T. 75). 
Billy Kunz, a cook from the restaurant, could not describe 
any features of the driver of the van, but did indicate that the 
sawed-off, stockless shotgun he found was unloaded (T. 78-88). He 
also indicated that the van he saw driving away was a newer model, 
and blue and white (T. 89). 
Elaine Anderson, a prep cook from the restaurant, saw Chris 
Hase on top of Mr. Runyon, and saw the nylon-masked person who had a 
medium build, weighed about 160 or 170 pounds, and was holding a 
shotgun (T. 90-95). 
Jimmy Powell, a dishwasher at the restaurant, testified 
that he tried to grab a cash bag from the masked person, who was 
sitting in a blue and white van (T. 101-104) . He later clarified 
that he thought the masked person had the cash bag, which was 
actually on the ground (T. 108). Mr. Powell grabbed on to the side 
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of the van and held on while the masked person was driving, but 
eventually let go (T. 104-106). He did not see the features of the 
masked person (T. 106). 
Officer Bradley Hunter responded to the robbery, to find an 
unidentified restaurant employee beating on Mr. Runyon (T. 
109-113). He noted that the shotgun had blood and fingerprints on 
it, was not loaded, and had been used as "a hitting instrument" (T. 
114-115). There were no fingerprints recoverable from the shotgun 
(T. 120). The masked suspect did not take the cash bags or any 
restaurant property with him (T. 119). 
Officer Courtney Nelson indicated that he participated in 
the search for Mr. Ewell, and that the officer was in the police 
department when Mr. Ewell was bought in, about an hour after the 
robbery was initially reported (T. 120-124). 
Officer Ondrak was driving an unmarked police car around 
looking for the blue and white Chevy van with no plates and Larry 
Miller stickers on it (T. 125-128, 129, 144). He began looking at 
between 9:30 and 9:45 p.m. (T. 142). He found a van meeting that 
description at 80th South and State Street at about 10:55 a.m. (T. 
128) . He identified Mr. Ewell as the driver of the van (T. 130). 
Officer Ondrak activated his lights and siren, but the van did not 
stop (T. 132). Officer Ondrak chased the van going 60 miles an hour 
in a residential, twenty-five-mile-an-hour zone, and let a marked 
car intercede in the chase (T. 132-134). The van hit two poles, a 
tree and a marked police car, which in turn, hit another marked 
police car (T. 132-134). When Officer Ondrak next saw the van after 
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the car accidents, the van and another marked police car were parked 
and empty on a street, and a citizen told Officer Ondrak "They went 
that way/1 pointing (T. 134). 
Numerous officers searched for the van driver, and Officer 
Ondrak eventually found Mr. Ewell scrunched up behind a chair in a 
stairwell (T. 137). There was a fifteen minute space of time 
between when Officer Ondrak found the parked van and found Mr. Ewell 
(T. 150). Officer Ondrak directed Mr. Ewell to come out from under 
the stairs, and Mr. Ewell did so, indicating that he would not 
resist Officer Ondrak (T. 139). 
Officer Carr was involved in the chase, and indicated that 
Mr. Ewell was the person he saw exit the van after the van hit the 
tree (T. 163). 
Michelle Andrus testified that Mr. Ewell knocked on her 
door at about 11:00 a.m. on the morning of May 28, 1991, and asked 
to use her phone, telling her that he had been robbed (T. 169-170). 
"He said that he was — that he had gone to a restaurant for coffee 
with someone he met the day before introduced by his father-in-law. 
He had been introduced to the gentleman by the father-in-law. They 
had gone to get something to eat and he went out to the car and the 
man came up with money bags, he had no idea what was going on and 
that the police were after him." (T. 170-171). She indicated that 
he was talking fast, and she was really uncomfortable (T. 171). She 
suggested that he turn himself in, and he told her that there was a 
warrant for his arrest and his wife was due to give birth to a child 
any day (T. 171). He then left her apartment (T. 171). 
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She indicated that he told her that "there had been a 
robbery and he was not with — he had just been coming by for coffee 
and that the guy came up — with the money bags. He was running 
from the police because he had a warrant for his arrest." (T. 174). 
Donald Runyon testified that he was sentenced to a term of 
five years to life for a different aggravated robbery, and that he 
was serving it at the Gunnison Prison (T. 178). When Mr. Runyon 
pled guilty to that aggravated robbery/ the State dismissed the 
aggravated robbery charge stemming from this case and three or four 
other charges of aggravated robbery (T. 183-184). Mr. Runyon 
indicated that he did not wish to testify against Mr. Ewell or at 
all (T. 179). He admitted that he drove a van with Jason Ewell to 
the restaurant, intending to rob the restaurant on May 28, 1991, 
indicating that it was Mr. Ewell's idea (T. 179-180). He identified 
the shotgun used in the robbery, indicating that they had gotten it 
from Mr. Ewell's step-father about two weeks before the robbery (T. 
181). Mr. Runyon did not see Mr. Ewell outside of the van, but 
testified that Mr. Ewell was to help him if the robbery went awry/ 
and that Mr. Ewell did come and help him (T. 182-183). Mr. Runyon 
indicated that he had not been promised anything or threatened into 
testifying, but stated his awareness that he might be able to 
improve his chances for parole by testifying against Mr. Ewell (T. 
186) . 
Defense counsel called Detective Ondrak to testify in the 
defense case, and the officer established that it takes about 7 to 
10 minutes to travel from the restaurant to the intersection where 
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Officer Ondrak first spotted the van, over an hour after the robbery 
(T. 189). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court should have granted Mr. Ewell's motion for 
a mistrial, when it came to light that one of the jurors had failed 
to reveal his bias against the right against self-incrimination, a 
bias to which he had admitted in a different voir dire before a 
different judge of the Third District Court, two days before the 
voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case. Mr. Ewell did not testify, and this 
juror who had previously confessed a concerns about a defendant's 
exercise of the right not to testify was the foreman of Mr. Ewell's 
jury (T. 219-220). Particularly in light of the impact of the other 
voir dire on the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case, the voir dire in Mr. 
Ewell's case was inadequate to insure his right to a fair trial 
before an impartial jury. 
The trial court misinterpreted the firearm enhancement 
statute in sentencing Mr. Ewell to an extra term of five years. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONDUCTED AN ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE 
AND GRANTED THE MISTRIAL MOTION STEMMING FROM 
A JUROR'S PROVISION OF MATERIAL MISINFORMATION 
DURING VOIR DIRE. 
A. IT IS THE TRIAL COURT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO INSURE THE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts to 
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insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire proceedings. 
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn.1-6 (Utah 1988)(citing 
Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution). The 
Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to reiterate 
to the trial courts of this state that it is their responsibility to 
insure that voir dire proceedings not only provide adequate 
information for the informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but 
also eliminate bias and prejudice from criminal trials. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991). In James, the court 
directed the trial courts to go beyond the minimally adequate voir 
dire required by federal constitutional standards, to thoroughly 
detect and probe juror biases to the best of their ability. Id. 
Utah's allegiance to the need for thorough voir dire in criminal 
cases has been strong and consistent. E.g. State v. Kavmark, 195 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 
844-845 (Utah 1988); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 
1984). 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the right to 
an impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 (e)(14) 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are 
adequate to reveal juror bias. The rule provides that a juror 
should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a state 
of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
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challenging[. ],f 
Trial courts are granted broad discretion and carry a heavy 
responsibility in conducting voir dire in criminal cases. E.g. 
Mu'Min v. Virginia. 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 504-510 (1991); State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991). Under the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, trial courts are not required to use voir dire questions 
requested by defense counsel in criminal cases, and defense 
attorneys are not required to object to the omissions of the trial 
courts. Compare Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 and 20(b) with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 46 and 47(a). The rules of criminal 
procedure are consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's exhortations 
to the trial courts to conduct effective voir dire, and with the 
constitutional rights at stake in criminal cases. E.g. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-798 (Utah 1991); State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 
439, 448 and nn.1-5 (Utah 1988). 
B. IN CONDUCTING THE VOIR DIRE AND RULING ON THE MOTION FOR A 
MISTRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT DEFEATED MR. EWELL'S RIGHTS TO A FAIR 
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
In assessing the trial court's voir dire of the prospective 
jurors, this Court will review the entire voir dire to determine if 
the trial court abused his discretion. Bishop, supra. Because the 
foreman of Mr. Ewell's jury was excused for his bias against a 
defendant's exercise of his right not to testify, in a voir dire 
before Judge Rokich two days before the trial in this case (T. 
219-220; 175-176), and because Judge Sawaya was apparently aware of 
the unusual events in the Rokich voir dire when Judge Sawaya 
-11-
conducted the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case (T. 217-218), it may be 
necessary for this Court to review the Rokich voir dire in order to 
assess the issues raised in this point. 
Counsel for Mr. Ewell renews the motion for judicial notice 
of and/or to supplement the record with the Rokich transcript. The 
State should address the judicial notice issue on the merits on 
appeal, so that this Court has a full opportunity to consider it.1 
A copy of the motion, the State's response, and order denying the 
motion are in Appendix 2, and a copy of the Rokich voir dire was 
filed in this Court and with the Attorney General's Office with the 
motion for judicial notice and/or to supplement the record. 
Regardless of whether this Court uses the Rokich voir dire, 
1. In opposing the motion, the State argued, 
The State takes no position on the issue at this 
time, but advises that defendant's request is 
premature and would be more fully and accurately 
addressed and decided in the context of the 
entire case upon full briefing and analysis of 
all the proceedings and evidence had below. Full 
briefing of all the issues on appeal is further 
warranted where reversal on any of the remaining 
issues raised by defendant would render 
consideration of the judicial notice issue 
unnecessary. Inclusion of the issue in the 
parties' briefing of the entire appeal would 
neither overburden nor complicate the briefing 
process and would engender no delay or prejudice 
to either side. 
Should this Court choose to resolve the 
judicial notice issue prior to plenary briefing 
of the appeal, the State would request an 
opportunity to address the merits of the issue. 
State's Memorandum at 3-4. 
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after reviewing the record in this case, this Court should conclude 
that in denying the motion for a mistrial and in conducting the voir 
dire, the trial court fell short of the court's state statutory and 
constitutional, and federal constitutional duties to insure Mr. 
Ewell's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
The following discussion will refer to the Rokich voir dire 
only to the extent that it is referred to in the record in Mr. 
Ewell's case. 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, outside the 
presence of the jurors, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because 
he had discovered the night before that one of Mr. Ewell's jurors, 
Jeffrey Bogaard, had previously been excused for cause after he had 
indicated during Judge Rokich's voir dire in another case that Juror 
Bogaard would want to know why a criminal defendant did not testify 
when he was questioned concerning his potential biases about the 
defendant's right not to testify. Defense counsel noted that he was 
unsure as to exactly what Mr. Bogaard had said during the Rokich 
voir dire. Defense counsel noted that Juror Bogaard had not 
indicated any potential bias concerning the defendant's right not to 
testify during the voir dire by Judge Sawaya in this case. Defense 
counsel indicated that Mr. Ewell did not intend to testify, 
indicated that Juror Bogaard's impartiality under Utah Rule of 
[Criminal] Procedure 18(e)(14) had been drawn into question, and 
that a mistrial was appropriate (T. 175-76). 
The trial court indicated it was his intention to deny the 
motion, but allowed the prosecutor to argue. The prosecutor argued 
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that the record was insufficient to support a motion for a mistrial, 
that defense counsel had the opportunity to voir dire the jurors, 
and that defense counsel was relying on hearsay from other defense 
attorneys in seeking a mistrial. The prosecutor indicated that he 
himself did not know which jurors served on Judge Rokich's panel, 
and informed Judge Sawaya that the court was not in a position to 
make a finding on that question. The prosecutor indicated that 
defense counsel was aware of something having happened (apparently 
the Rokich voir dire) the day before the Sawaya voir dire, and had 
the opportunity to participate in voir dire, and should not be 
arguing on the basis of hearsay concerning what occurred in the 
Rokich voir dire (T. 176-177). 
The court ruled, 
I don't know what happened in Judge Rokich's 
court or what attitude Mr. Bogaard may have had 
at that time, but I am satisfied that during my 
voir dire of the panel, Mr. Bogaard and all the 
other jurors indicated they would be willing to 
follow the law as I instructed them and part of 
that was that the defendant has a right not to 
testify and that his failure to testify is not a 
circumstance that you can hold against him and no 
presumptions against him can be raised. I am 
satisfied that Mr. Bogaard and all the members of 
this panel are willing to follow the law of the 
case as I state it and that no adverse 
presumption would be raised against the 
defendant. So the motion will be denied. 
(T. 177). 
After the jury retired to deliberate, defense counsel 
sought to clarify the record. Defense counsel indicated his 
previous and incorrect assumption that the jurors who had indicated 
a bias against a defendant exercising his right to silence in the 
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Rokich voir dire were not recycled in Judge Sawaya's court, and that 
he was unaware of the need to voir dire the jurors on their 
experience in Judge Rokich's voir dire in this case. (T. 217). 
Despite the trial court's indication that argument was unnecessary, 
the prosecutor stated his recollection of an in-chambers discussion 
of the fact that jurors excused from Judge Rokich's court would be 
recycled in Mr. Ewell's case, and discussion of the reason that the 
jurors had been excused from Judge Rokich's court. (T. 217-218). 
The court again ruled, 
I think the record has been made clear about 
the court's feeling about what occurred. I don't 
feel that the fact that they were disqualified or 
excused from service in Judge Rokich's court 
disqualifies them in service in this court. I 
think the court's questions on voir dire to each 
of those panel members gave them an opportunity 
to disclose their feeling or their reluctance to 
serve in this case based upon the defendant's 
failure to testify. No one responded. Even the 
one juror that was seated, Mr. Bogaard, was given 
an opportunity to indicate that the fact that the 
defendant might not testify would raise some 
questions in his mind about the response. I 
don't think there's any reason to feel that the 
jury was in any way tainted or that the defendant 
has been prejudiced in any manner by Mr. Bogaard 
being seated. So I think the record is clear on 
that issue. 
(T. 218). 
The trial court erred in ruling that Juror Bogaard's 
failure to reveal his bias against a defendant's right not to 
testify during the Ewell voir dire obviated any need to inquire into 
Juror Bogaard's previous expression of that bias in Judge Rokich's 
voir dire. As defense counsel argued to the trial court, Juror 
Bogaard's failure to reveal this bias that he had expressed only two 
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days before in a voir dire in a criminal case with Judge Rokich 
calls Juror Bogaard's honesty and impartiality into question. See 
State v. Suarez. 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Suarez, a district court judge presiding over a criminal 
case declined to excuse for cause a recycled prospective juror who 
had been excused for cause in a different district court criminal 
voir dire. According to an affidavit of a defense attorney from the 
first voir dire, the prospective juror had expressed a pro-police 
bias during the first voir dire; yet the juror failed to reveal this 
bias in the second voir dire. Id. at 936. This Court set forth the 
two-pronged test for assessing such issues: 
To obtain a new trial, a defendant "must first 
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire, and 
then further show that a correct response would 
have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause." 
Id. at 938, quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 
U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 
The Suarez Court addressed the second prong first, finding 
the second prong readily met, because the prospective juror's 
pro-police bias would have provided a basis for a for-cause 
challenge. Id. at 938. Similarly, had Juror Bogaard indicated his 
concern about a defendant's exercise of his right not to testify, 
this would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause, 
particularly in this case where Mr. Ewell had submitted voir dire 
questions and jury instructions on inferences to be drawn from the 
defendant's exercise of his right not to testify (R. 27, 64), 
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indicated early in the voir dire that he might not take the stand 
(T. 11), and did not take the stand. Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18(e)(14) (juror must be excused if "a state of mind 
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the partyr.]") 
(emphasis added). See also, e.g.. State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 
1083-84 (Utah App. 1989)(juror who expressed view that defendant had 
burden to establish his innocence was sufficiently rehabilitated by 
further questioning to qualify for service). 
In addressing the first prong of the test, the Suarez Court 
did not explicitly reach the conclusion that the juror had failed to 
honestly answer a voir dire question. The Court recognized that 
dishonesty was not the only explanation for the juror's failure to 
express the bias in the second voir dire to which he had admitted in 
the first voir dire, indicating that the juror may have lied in the 
first voir dire to avoid jury service and then had a change of heart 
between the two jury selections, or that the juror may have lost the 
bias between the two jury selections. Suarez. 793 P.2d at 939 
n.ll. The Suarez Court concluded on the record before the Court, 
wherein the juror's comments in the first voir dire were recorded in 
a perhaps imprecise affidavit of an attorney involved in the first 
voir dire, and wherein the second trial court did not consult with 
the first trial court or investigate the discrepancy between the two 
jury selections with the juror, the trial court should have granted 
the challenge for cause. Id. at 939. In so concluding, the Suarez 
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Court relied on the well-established body of Utah law that when a 
prospective juror makes statements implying bias, the trial court 
must excuse the juror for cause, or examine the juror sufficiently 
to rebut the inference of bias. Id. at 939 and n.ll, citing State 
v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980).2 
Similarly, in the instant case, Judge Sawaya neither 
conferred with Judge Rokich on the record, nor investigated the 
discrepancy between Juror Bogaard's answers during the Rokich and 
Ewell jury selections. On this record, the trial court did not 
rebut the inference of bias arising from Juror Bogaard's concern 
about the defendant's right not to testify, and under Suarez, Mr. 
Ewell is entitled to a new trial. See also State v. Thomas, 777 
P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989)(court remanded case to trial court to 
determine if jurors had been dishonest in failing to answer a 
material voir dire question, because voir dire question at issue was 
vague, and jurors may not have understood it); State v. Thomas, 830 
P.2d 243 (Utah 1992)(plurality)(majority reversing trial court's 
conclusion that the jurors had failed to honestly answer a material 
2. See also State v. Kavmark, 195 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989)(juror 
acquaintance with prosecutor, when probed during voir dire, did not 
raise inference of bias requiring rebuttal); State v. Woollev, 810 
P.2d 440, 442-448 (Utah App.)(inference of bias arising from juror's 
prior victimization of same crime at issue in case was not 
sufficiently rebutted), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 658-661 (Utah App. 1992)(trial court 
failed to remove juror for cause, or to examine her to determine if 
inference of bias stemming from her relationships with the 
prosecutor and police was rebutted). 
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question during voir dire, plurality expressing various views as to 
interpretation of the second prong of the test on the facts of that 
case)• 
The voir dire itself demonstrates that the trial court 
neglected his responsibility to insure Mr. Ewell's rights to a fair 
and impartial jury trial. It appears from the prosecutor's argument 
to the trial court that prior to the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case, 
the court was aware that recycled jurors from Judge Rokich's voir 
dire had indicated a bias against defendants who exercise their 
rights against self incrimination (T. 217-218). It appears from the 
Ewell voir dire that the trial court was determined to seat a jury 
that appeared impartial, and that the trial court may have 
intimidated the jurors to accomplish this end. For instance, at the 
outset of the voir dire, the trial court asked the jurors to state 
their name, occupation, spouse's name, and spouse's occupation, and 
the court unexpectedly villified one of the prospective jurors. The 
court's colloquy with one of the prospective jurors was as follows: 
Q: Delbert Iorg? 
A: None, none and single. 
Q: No occupation? 
A: No. 
Q: You have never worked in your life? 
A: Cleaning horse stalls for my dad. 
Q: Must do something, Mr. Iorg. 
THE COURT: You don't want to be here, do you? 
A: I don't know. 
THE COURT: We'll let you sit through the whole 
trial whether you like it or not. 
(T. 7). In later voir dire, Mr. Iorg indicated that he read the 
Deseret News, and the trial court asked him, "Okay, what's the limit 
of your education?" (T. 30). Other jurors were asked how far they 
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went in school (T. 26), or their "education" (T. 26, 31). This 
series of events undoubtedly encouraged the jurors to answer the 
voir dire questions in a manner pleasing to the trial court, and 
chilled juror participation during the voir dire. See State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988)(voir dire is supposed to 
be a subtle and accurate culling of subconscious and conscious 
information from prospective jurors). 
The trial court's pontifications on the defendant's right 
not to testify further demonstrate the trial court's failure to seek 
out, rather than suppress, juror biases. When the trial court asked 
defense counsel to identify the defense witnesses during voir dire, 
and defense counsel indicated that the defendant might or might not 
testify, rather than inquiring into potential biases, the trial 
court instructed the jurors as follows: 
All right. Under the law, ladies and 
gentlemen, a defendant charged with a criminal 
offense is presumed to be innocent until he's 
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This defendant comes here clothed with the 
presumption of innocence, meaning that the state 
has the burden of proving his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the evidence doesn't rise 
to that level then your duty as jurors would be 
to return a verdict of not guilty. The defendant 
has a right to remain silent meaning he doesn't 
have to take the stand and testify unless he 
wishes to. The defendant may be satisfied with 
the evidence presented by the state and feel that 
there's nothing to add to it. Are there any of 
you who feel you cannot afford the defendant the 
benefit of the presumption of innocence and his 
right to remain silent? If for any reason you 
feel he is not entitled to those rights, would 
you raise your hand. The record may show that no 
hands are raised. 
(T. 11-12). 
-20-
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the court to 
inquire about whether the jurors felt that a defendant should come 
forward and testify, despite his right not to do so (T. 32). Rather 
than seeking out juror bias, the court again instructed the jurors, 
Let me explain that before you respond to 
it. No criminal defendant has an obligation to 
testify. The constitution preserves the right to 
the remain silent of anybody who's accused and 
the fact that a defendant does not take the stand 
and testify can't be used against him. You can 
raise no presumptions against him because of that 
fact. I will ask whether or not, if this 
defendant for example decides not to testify, 
whether any of you would hold that against him or 
find that is something that is — you should 
consider against him in determining his guilt or 
innocence? If you feel that way would you raise 
your hand. The record may show that no hands are 
raised. 
(T. 32). 
During the course of the voir dire, not one prospective 
juror ever admitted to any bias that would impact on the juror's 
performance. After reviewing the overall voir dire, this Court 
should conclude that the trial court's voir dire was inadequate to 
provide counsel with sufficient information about the prospective 
jurors, and that a new trial is in order. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE FIREARM STATUTE 
IN SENTENCING MR. EWELL. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Ewell for his aggravated 
robbery conviction stemming from his guilty plea in case no. 
911901243, and for his aggravated robbery conviction stemming from 
the jury conviction in case no. 9119011244, in a hearing on February 
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28, 1992. In case no. 911901244, the trial court imposed a five to 
life sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction, and a one year 
firearm enhancement (T. 235). In case no. 911901243, the trial 
court imposed a five to life sentence for the aggravated robbery 
conviction, and a one year firearm enhancement (T. 235). The court 
then indicated that the statute mandated an additional five year 
sentence because there were "two offenses committed with the use of 
a firearm." (T. 236). The court ordered the sentences for the two 
cases to run consecutively, ordering a total sentence of seventeen 
years to life (T. 235-236). 
The statute governing the propriety of the five year 
firearm enhancement stemming from the two convictions is Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-3-203. It states, in relevant part, 
A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at not less than five years, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, 
and which may be for life but if the trier of 
fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or 
representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
.... 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment for a felony in which a 
firearm was used or involved in the 
accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of 
another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony 
shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed, 
be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not 
less than five nor more than ten years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
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In imposing the consecutive five year firearm enhancement, 
the trial court misconstrued subsection (4) of section 76-3-203. 
Under subsection (4), the enhancement is only applicable if one who 
"has been sentenced" for a firearm felony is "convicted" of another 
firearm felony. Mr. Ewell was sentenced for both firearm felonies 
on February 28, 1991, and both of his convictions preceded this 
date: in case no. 911901243, Mr. Ewell's conviction was established 
by his guilty plea on January 10, 1992; in case no. 900901244, Mr. 
Ewell's conviction was established by the jury verdict on December 
13, 1991. 
Because the sentencing of a firearm felony did not precede 
the conviction of the other firearm felony, under the plain language 
of the statute, the firearm enhancement in subsection (4) does not 
apply. In using the terms "has been sentenced" and "convicted,"3 
3. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term conviction as 
follows: 
In a general sense, the result of a criminal 
trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that 
the accused is guilty as charged. 
"Conviction" and "convicted" mean the final 
judgment on a verdict or finding of guilty, a 
plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, and 
do not include a final judgment which has been 
expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, or 
otherwise rendered nugatory. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4251. 
The final consummation of the prosecution 
including the judgment or sentence, or as is 
frequently the case, the judgment or sentence 
itself. Ex parte White, 76 Okl.Cr. 204, 130 P.2d 
103, 104. The stage of a criminal proceeding 
where the issue of guilt is determined. United 
States v. Locke, 409 F.Supp. 600. 
A record of the summary proceedings upon any 
penal statute before one or more justice of the 
(footnote continues) 
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the legislature indicated an intent that crimes used for this five 
to ten year consecutive enhancement must follow sequentially.4 The 
legislature's choice to impose the additional five to ten year 
consecutive sentence only for firearm felony convictions involving a 
defendant who "has been sentenced" for a firearm felony reflects the 
legislature's choice to impose the harshest penalty on those 
defendants who have experienced a firearm-enhanced sentence, and 
then incur another felony firearm conviction. Compare the firearm 
enhancement statute with the habitual criminal statute, Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-8-1001 (imposing enhancement regardless of sequence 
of convictions). See United States v. Abreu and Thornbruah. 962 
F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992)(en banc)(court reversed firearm 
enhancement under federal statute, because convictions underlying 
(footnote 3 continued) 
peace or other persons duly authorized, in a case 
where the offender has been convicted and 
sentenced. 
Black's defines sentence as follows: 
The judgment formally pronounced by the court or 
judge upon the defendant after his conviction in 
a criminal prosecution, imposing the punishment 
to be inflicted. Judgment formally declaring to 
accused legal consequences of guilt which he has 
confessed or of which he has been convicted. The 
word is properly confined to this meaning. ... 
4. While the terms conviction and sentence are sometimes 
used interchangeably in legalese, e.g. State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 
62-64 (Utah App. 1991), the fact that the legislature used the two 
different terms in the same statute indicates that the legislature 
indicated for the terms to have separate meanings. E.g. Seeber v. 
Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 634 P.2d 303 (Wash. 
1981). See also Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 
1988)(court has "fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to 
every word of "the statute."). 
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enhanced sentence did not meet sequential requirement of statute). 
Adherence to the plain language of statutes is required by 
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, which is 
explicitly required in Article V section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. As Sutherland explains, 
The preference for literalism in determining 
the effect of a statute is based on the 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
The courts owe fidelity to the will of the 
legislature. What a legislature says in the text 
of a statute is considered the best evidence of 
the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the 
courts are bound to give effect to the expressed 
intent of the legislature. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has captured this idea in the 
following language: "It is an elementary 
proposition that courts only determine by 
construction the scope and intent of the law when 
the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a 
law is plain and within the legislative power, it 
declares itself and nothing is left for 
interpretation. It is as binding upon the court 
as upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such 
a case, to say that the law must mean something 
different from the common import of its language, 
because the court may think that its penalties 
are unwise or harsh would make the judicial 
superior to the legislative branch of the 
government, and practically invest it with the 
lawmaking power. ..." 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §46.03 (citation omitted). 
If the plain language of the sentencing statute did not 
preclude the imposition of the additional firearm enhancement under 
subsection (4), the rule of lenity would require this interpretation 
of the statute. The rule requires that criminal sentencing statutes 
be construed strictly so that penalties unintended by the 
legislature are not imposed. See State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 
(Utah 1987)(Durham, J., dissenting)("It is well established that 
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ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of 
lenity.ff) ; Abreu and Thornbruah, supra (utilizing the rule of lenity 
in interpreting the federal firearm statute). 
This Court should reverse the portion of the sentence 
imposing a five year firearm enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Ewell's conviction in case 
no. 911901244, and reverse the five year firearm enhancement under 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203(4). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J I day of i 1992. 
ELIZABETH HdiB^OOk 
Attorney for Mr. Ewell 
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APPENDIX 1 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 




Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person $h*U be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behal£ to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3*203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of 
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or 
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any 
other sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not 
less than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not con-
currently. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of 
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
Ob) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 46. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice h*™ 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. 
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
vided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge* 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place 
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
charged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
cient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. -
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for tiie trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
Gii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court snail decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective jntot and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
eiyoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons 
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
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MOTION AND ORDERS 
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND/OR 
TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
AND TO STRIKE BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
Case No. 920379-CA 
Priority No. 2 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, Jason Ewell, by and through 
counsel of record, Elizabeth Holbrook, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 201 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h), and moves 
this Court to take judicial notice of and/or supplement the record 
with the transcript of the voir dire in State v. Ramirez. Case No. 
91190177, presided over by Judge John A. Rokich on December 10, 1992, 
A copy of the transcript is filed separately with the Court 
of Appeals and with the Attorney General's Office today. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of points and 
authorities, attached to this motion. 
Mr. Ewell further moves that the briefing schedule be 
stricken pending resolution of this motion. The State stipulates to 
striking the briefing schedule, and reserves the right to file a 
separate response to the motion for judicial notice and/or for 
supplementation of the record. 
The opening brief is currently due on October 19, 1992. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1992. 
*m rmm/ 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
Attorney for itefendant/Appellant 
STIPULATION 
I, David B. Thompson, hereby stipulate to striking the 
briefing schedule pending resolution of the motion for judicial 
notice and/or to supplement the record. The State reserves the 
right to file a separate response to the motion for judicial notice 
and/or to supplement the record. 
DATED this day of October, 1992. 
)AVID B/ THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the briefing schedule is stricken 
pending resolution of the motion for judicial notice and/or for 
supplementation of the record. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
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ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will take judicial 
notice of the transcript of State v. Ramirez. Case No. 91190177, 
tried before Judge Rokich on December 10, 1992. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
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ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record shall be supplemented 
with the transcript of State v. Ramirez. Case No. 91190177, tried 
before Judge Rokich on December 10, 1992. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
AND/OR SUPPLEMENTATION OF 
THE RECORD 
Case No. 920379-CA 
Priority No* 2 
FACTS 
Mr. Ewell was charged with one count of aggravated robbery 
(R. 6). Judge Sawaya presided over a jury trial on December 12 and 
13 of 1991 (R. 17-19). The jury convicted Mr. Ewell as he was 
charged, and Judge Sawaya sentenced Mr. Ewell to serve a term of 
five years to life for the conviction charged in this case; to an 
additional five years for a "second conviction," and to an 
additional year for a "firearm enhancement." (R. 18, 102, 105). 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, outside the 
presence of the jurors, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because 
he had discovered the night before that one of Mr. Ewell7s jurors, 
Jeffrey Bogaard, had previously been excused for cause after he had 
indicated during Judge Rokich's voir dire in the case of State v. 
Ramirez that Juror Bogaard would want to know why a criminal 
defendant did not testify when he was questioned concerning his 
potential biases about the defendant's right not to testify. 
Defense counsel noted that he was unsure as to exactly what 
Mr. Bogaard had said during the Ramirez voir dire. Defense counsel 
noted that Juror Bogaard had not indicated any potential bias 
concerning the defendant's right not to testify during the voir dire 
by Judge Sawaya in this case. Defense counsel indicated that 
Mr. Ewell did not intend to testify, indicated that Juror Bogaard's 
impartiality under Utah Rule of [Criminal] Procedure 18(e)(14) had 
been drawn into question, and that a mistrial was appropriate. (T. 
175-176). 
The trial court indicated it was his intention to deny the 
motion, but allowed the prosecutor to argue. The prosecutor argued 
that the record was insufficient to support a motion for a mistrial, 
that defense counsel had the opportunity to voir dire the jurors, 
and that defense counsel was relying on hearsay from other defense 
attorneys in seeking a mistrial. The prosecutor indicated that he 
himself did not know which jurors served on Judge Rokich's panel, 
and informed Judge Sawaya that he was not in a position to make a 
finding on that question. The prosecutor indicated that defense 
counsel was aware of something having happened (apparently the 
Rokich voir dire) the day before the Sawaya voir dire, and had the 
opportunity to participate in voir dire, and should not be arguing 
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on the basis of hearsay concerning what occurred in the Rokich voir 
dire. (T. 176-177). 
The court ruled, 
I don't know what happened in Judge Rokich's 
court or what attitude Mr. Bogaard may have had 
at that time, but I am satisfied that during my 
voir dire of the panel, Mr. Bogaard and all the 
other jurors indicated they would be willing to 
follow the law as I instructed them and part of 
that was that the defendant has a right not to 
testify and that his failure to testify is not a 
circumstance that you can hold against him and no 
presumptions against him can be raised. I am 
satisfied that Mr. Bogaard and all the members of 
this panel are willing to follow the law of the 
case as I state it and that no adverse 
presumption would be raised against the 
defendant. So the motion will be denied. 
(T. 177). 
After the jury retired to deliberate, defense counsel 
sought to clarify the record, indicating that he did not know that 
jurors excused from Judge Rokich's voir dire were serving on 
Mr. Ewell's case until the morning of the second day of Mr. Ewell's 
trial. Defense counsel indicated his previous and incorrect 
assumption that the jurors who had indicated a bias against a 
defendant exercising his right to silence in the Rokich voir dire 
were not recycled in Judge Sawaya's court, and that he was unaware 
of the need to voir dire the jurors on their experience in Judge 
Rokich's voir dire in this case. (T. 217). Despite the trial 
court's indication that argument was unnecessary, the prosecutor 
stated his recollection of an in-chambers discussion of the fact 
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that jurors excused from Judge Rokich's court would be recycled in 
Mr. Ewell's case, and discussion of the reason that the jurors had 
been excused from Judge Rokich's court. (T. 217-218) . 
The trial court stated, 
I think the record has been made clear about 
the court's feeling about what occurred. I don't 
feel that the fact that they were disqualified or 
excused from service in Judge Rokich's court 
disqualifies them in service in this court. I 
think the court's questions on voir dire to each 
of those panel members gave them an opportunity 
to disclose their feeling or their reluctance to 
serve in this case based upon the defendant's 
failure to testify. No one responded. Even the 
one juror that was seated, Mr. Bogaard, was given 
an opportunity to indicate that the fact that the 
defendant might not testify would raise some 
questions in his mind about the response. I 
don't think there's any reason to feel that the 
jury was in any way tainted or that the defendant 
has been prejudiced in any manner by Mr. Bogaard 
being seated. So I think the record is clear on 
that issue. 
(T. 218). 
Mr. Bogaard was the foreman of Mr. Ewell's jury (T. 
221-220). 
During the voir dire in Judge Rokich's Ramirez case, Judge 
Rokich was unable to seat a jury on December 10, 1992, because 
fourteen of the prospective jurors indicated during voir dire in 
open court some bias against a defendant who does not testify (R.T. 
43-46) . Juror Bogaard, who did not indicate any bias of any nature 
during Mr. Ewell's voir dire with Judge Sawaya, indicated during the 
Ramirez voir dire, "I'm not sure if it would sway my opinion one way 
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or another. I would want — depends on the course of the trial, it 
might sway me. I have no opinion one way or another. Depending on 
what comes out, it might have an effect." (R.T. 46). Prior to 
excusing the jurors in the Ramirez voir dire, Judge Rokich 
instructed the jurors on the defendant's right not to testify (R.T. 
46-47), and lectured the jurors about their shocking inability to be 
fair and follow the law concerning the defendant's right to silence 
in Mr. Ramirez's case (R.T. 56-58). 
Having had this learning experience in Judge Rokich's voir 
dire, Mr. Bogaard reported to Judge Sawaya's court on December 12, 
1992. Early in the Ewell voir dire, Judge Sawaya inexplicably 
vilified one of the prospective jurors, undoubtedly impressing the 
prospective jurors with the need to answer the voir dire questions 
in a manner pleasing to the judge. At the outset of the voir dire, 
Judge Sawaya instructed the prospective jurors to state their name, 
employment, occupation, name of spouse and spouses' occupation (T. 
3) The court's colloquy with one of the prospective jurors was as 
follows: 
Q: Delbert Iorg? 
A: None, none and single. 
Q: No occupation? 
A: No. 
Q: You have never worked in your life? 
A: Cleaning horse stalls for my dad. 
Q: Must do something, Mr. Iorg. 
THE COURT: You don't want to be here, do you? 
A: I don't know. 
THE COURT: We'll let you sit through the whole 
trial whether you like it or not. 
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(T. 7). In later voir dire, Mr. Iorg indicated that he read the 
Deseret News, and the trial court asked him, "Okay, what's the limit 
of your education?" (T. 30). Other jurors were asked how far they 
went in school (T. 26), or their "education" (T. 26, 31). 
It appears that perhaps Judge Sawaya had heard of Judge 
Rokich's experience in the Ramirez case prior to this voir dire (T. 
217-218, prosecutor's argument). Judge Sawaya addressed the jurors' 
possible biases concerning the defendant's general rights as follows: 
All right. Under the law, ladies and 
gentlemen, a defendant charged with a criminal 
offense is presumed to be innocent until he's 
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This defendant comes here clothed with the 
presumption of innocence, meaning that the state 
has the burden of proving his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the evidence doesn't rise 
to that level then your duty as jurors would be 
to return a verdict of not guilty. The defendant 
has a right to remain silent meaning he doesn't 
have to take the stand and testify unless he 
wishes to. The defendant may be satisfied with 
the evidence presented by the state and feel that 
there's nothing to add to it. Are there any of 
you who feel you cannot afford the defendant the 
benefit of the presumption of innocence and his 
right to remain silent? If for any reason you 
feel he is not entitled to those rights, would 
you raise your hand. The record may show that no 
hands are raised. Are there any of are you who 
feel that the defendant by reason of the fact 
that he's been charged with the commission of 
this offense is more likely to be guilty than 
innocent by reason of that fact alone? If you 
feel that way would you raise your hand. The 
record may show that no hands are raised. 
(T. 11-12). 
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the court to 
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inquire about whether the jurors felt that a defendant should come 
forward and testify, despite his right not to do so (T. 32). The 
court stated, 
Let me explain that before vou respond to 
it. No criminal defendant has an obligation to 
testify. The constitution preserves the right to 
the remain silent of anybody who's accused and 
the fact that a defendant does not take the stand 
and testify can't be used against him. You can 
raise no presumptions against him because of that 
fact. I will ask whether or not, if this 
defendant for example decides not to testify, 
whether any of you would hold that against him or 
find that is something that is — you should 
consider against him in determining his guilt or 
innocence? If you feel that way would you raise 
your hand. The record may show that no hands are 
raised. 
(T. 32)(emphasis added)• 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
AND/OR SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD WITH 
THE ROKICH VOIR DIRE. 
The Ramirez voir dire is necessary to Mr. Ewell's case in 
order for him to establish that Juror Bogaard failed to honestly 
answer a material question in Mr. Ewell's case, and that had Juror 
Bogaard honestly answered the question, his answer would have 
subjected Juror Bogaard to a for-cause challenge. See e.g. State v. 
Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 938-39 (Utah App. 1990)(finding that recycled 
juror's failure to disclose bias in favor of police in second trial 
that he had disclosed in the first required a new trial) . The trial 
court's failure to take any evidence on Juror Bogaard7s performance 
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in Judge Rokich's voir dire is a result of the trial court's 
erroneous view of the law that the voir dire in Mr. Ewell's case 
demonstrated juror impartiality, and obviated any need to inquire 
into inconsistent answers given by Mr. Ewell's jurors during their 
voir dire with Judge Rokich. 
This Court should exercise its discretion and take judicial 
notice of the Ramirez transcript. Utah Rule of Evidence 201 
provides in part that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." The rule further 
provides, flA court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information," and that 
M[jJudicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding." 
The certified transcript of the Ramirez voir dire is sufficiently 
reliable, and taking judicial notice of it is appropriate and 
necessary. See State v. Bates, 61 P. 905 (Utah 1900) (state court 
will take judicial notice of court documents in federal case 
involving defendant and will "'generally take notice of whatever 
ought to be generally known, within the limits of its 
jurisdiction.'") (citations omitted). 
This Court should supplement the record with the Ramirez 
transcript. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) provides, in 
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part, wIf anything material to either party is omitted from the 
record by error accident or is misstated, the parties by 
stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before 
or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental 
record be certified and transmitted." Material evidence concerning 
Juror Bogaard's performance in Judge Rokich's court was erroneously 
omitted from the record, as a result of Judge Sawaya's erroneous 
view of the law, that satisfactory answers during his voir dire of 
Mr. Ewell's jurors obviated a need to inquire into their performance 
in Judge Rokich's court. Supplementing the record with this 
transcript is appropriate under this Court's caselaw. See State v. 
Jesche, 793 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)(factors for appellate 
court to consider in supplementing the record are "the necessity of 
the supplemental material, prior opportunity to introduce the 
supplemental material and length of the resulting delay."). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should take judicial notice of and/or supplement 
the record with the transcript of the voir dire in State v. Ramirez, 
Criminal No. 91190177, presided over by Judge John A. Rokich on 
December 10, 1992. 
9-
i4 
Respectfully submitted this / J day of October, 1992, 
EMfcABETH 
Attorney f orT* Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : MEMORANDUM OPPOSING MOTION 
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND/OR TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD 
v. : 
JASON EWELL, z Case No. 920379-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The State, by and through counsel Kris C. Leonard, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby responds to defendant Jason 
Ewell's motion for judicial notice and/or to supplement the 
record and to strike the briefing schedule. This response is 
filed pursuant to rule 23(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Jason Ewell appeals from his conviction by a 
jury of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 105).l Jury selection 
1
 Defendant originally filed separate appeals stemming from a 
conviction on a guilty plea to one count of aggravated robbery and 
a conviction by a jury for one count of aggravated robbery. The 
cases were consolidated by this Court's order dated September 16, 
1992, pursuant to the parties' stipulated motion to consolidate. 
The records for both cases have been included in the appellate 
record. All citations to the record in this memorandum are to the 
record in District Court No. 911901244 unless otherwise noted. 
for defendant's trial began on December 12, 1991 (R. 17). During 
the voir dire, the court questioned the jurors concerning their 
ability to "afford to the defendant the benefit of the 
presumption of innocence and his right to remain silent" should 
he choose not to testify at trial (Trial Transcript [hereinafter 
Tr.] at 11). The lack of response from any juror indicates that 
all of them believed that they could properly apply both the 
presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent. 
Defendant later requested further inquiry by the court on the 
same subject (Tr. at 31-32). The court explained the defendant's 
right to remain silent and further inquired whether the jurors 
would consider defendant's failure to testify, if he so chose, 
against him in their deliberations (Tr. at 32). Again, none of 
the jurors responded, indicating that a failure to testify would 
not adversely affect their deliberations. Thereafter, the jury 
was impaneled, and the State presented the majority of its case 
before the proceedings adjourned for the day. 
On December 13, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
informing the court that he had learned the night before that one 
of the jurors, Jeffrey Bogaard, had participated in voir dire 
proceedings in another court on December 10 and had been excused 
for cause based on a statement he had made regarding a 
defendant's choice not to testify at trial (Tr. at 175-76). 
Defense counsel offered only his verbal statement in support of 
his motion and made no proffer of evidence regarding the December 
10 proceedings. Defendant contended that the new, albeit 
2 
unsubstantiated, information raised an inference of impartiality 
under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) despite the fact 
that the juror had not indicated any potential bias during the 
voir dire in the instant case, thereby requiring declaration of a 
mistrial (Tr. at 176), The court denied defendant's motion (Tr. 
at 177). Defendant now seeks to include a transcript of the 
December 10 voir dire proceedings [hereinafter "voir dire 
transcript"] in the record on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DETERMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT 
THIS COURT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE 
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT SHOULD AWAIT PLENARY 
BRIEFING OF ALL THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS 
APPEAL 
Defendant urges this Court to exercise its discretion 
to take judicial notice of the voir dire transcript from 
proceedings in another court pursuant to rule 201, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, arguing that the certified transcript he has supplied 
to this Court is "sufficiently reliable" and that taking such 
notice is appropriate and necessary. The State takes no position 
on the issue at this time, but advises that defendant's request 
is premature and would be more fully and accurately addressed and 
decided in the context of the entire case upon full briefing and 
analysis of all the proceedings and evidence had below. Full 
briefing of all the issues on appeal is further warranted where 
reversal on any of the remaining issues raised by defendant would 
render consideration of the judicial notice issue unnecessary. 
3 
Inclusion of the issue in the parties' briefing of the entire 
appeal would neither overburden nor complicate the briefing 
process and would engender no delay or prejudice to either side. 
Should this Court choose to resolve the judicial notice 
issue prior to plenary briefing of the appeal, the State would 
request an opportunity to address the merits of the issue. 
POINT II 
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD IS NOT 
APPROPRIATE UNDER RULE 11(H), UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Defendant asserts, in the alternative, that this Court 
should permit supplementation of the record with the voir dire 
transcript because it was erroneously omitted from the record 
below due to the trial court's mistaken interpretation of the 
law. 
Supplementation of the record on appeal is permitted by 
rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 11 provides 
that the record may be supplemented with anything material to 
either party "which is omitted from the record by error or 
accident or is misstated". Consideration of a motion to 
supplement the record requires evaluation of several factors, 
including "the necessity of the supplemental material, prior 
opportunity to introduce the supplemental material and length of 
the resulting delay." Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428, 428-29 
(Utah App. 1990). 
While the necessity and materiality of the voir dire 
transcript should be determined in the context of the entire 
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appeal and upon full analysis of all the issues to be raised by 
defendant (see Point I, above), it is clear that the transcript 
was not omitted from the record either by error or by accident as 
contemplated by rule 11 inasmuch as it was not intended to be 
included in the record and was never offered below despite ample 
opportunity. Defendant attributes the omission to error on the 
part of the trial court when in fact defendant himself failed to 
include any form of documentation of the voir dire proceedings in 
the record. Although he addressed the impartiality issue on the 
second day of the trial and again after the jury had retired to 
deliberate, defendant failed to submit the transcript, an 
affidavit or any other form of evidence regarding the December 10 
voir dire, did not suggest that the trial court might consider 
such evidence, and did not request that the trial court take 
judicial notice of the December 10 voir dire proceedings. 
Defendant's attempt to expand rule 11 beyond its contemplated 
purpose to introduce into the appellate record material neither 
advanced or contemplated below should be rejected. See Olson v. 
Park-Craio-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 1991) 
(rule 11 was not intended to allow introduction of new material 
into the record); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478 n.17 (Utah 
1990). 
POINT III 
THE BRIEFING SCHEDULE IN THIS MATTER SHOULD 
BE RESET TO ALLOW FOR PROMPT RESOLUTION OF 
THE APPEAL 
The parties have stipulated to striking the briefing 
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schedule in this matter to allow defendant to present his motion 
regarding the December 10 voir dire. Should this Court defer its 
consideration and determination of the judicial notice issue and 
allow inclusion of the issue in the parties' full briefing of the 
appeal, the State would urge that the briefing schedule be reset 
as soon as possible to prevent any further delay in the 
resolution of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court deny defendant's request to supplement 
the record with the voir dire transcript. The State further 
requests that this Court defer its consideration of defendant's 
motion to take judicial notice of the transcript, allowing 
inclusion of the issue in the parties' plenary briefing of this 
appeal. Finally, the State requests that this Court establish a 
new briefing schedule, permitting defendant thirty days from the 
date of this Court's decision in this matter in which to file his 
appeal, with the State's brief due thirty days thereafter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Cpb day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Opposing Motion for Judicial Notice and/or 
to Supplement the Record was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elizabeth Holbrook, attorney for appellant, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, 424 East 500 south, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 6?U day of Octobe^r-1992. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 — ~ 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jason Ewell, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
* ut ^-=B» u**mt >jm*S 
NOV 9 1992 
Ut?r . -
ORDER 
Case No. 920379-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Garff (on Law & Motion). 
This matter is before the court on appellant's motion for 
judicial notice, motion to supplement the record and motion to 
strike the briefing schedule. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions are denied. 
Appellant's brief shall be filed on or before November 17, 1992, 
Dated this 9th day of November, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of November, 1992, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a 
personal representative of the Legal Defender's Office and the 
Attorney General's Office to be delivered to the parties listed 
below: 
Charles F. Loyd, Jr. 
Elizabeth Holbrook 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys at Law 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dated this 9th day of November, 1992. 
Deputy Gierk 
